6 posts tagged “history”

This is now the fourth posting in my "In Concord" series, in which I have been trying to capture the thoughts and reflections that occupy me when I go to the Old North Bridge in Concord, Massachusetts, a hallowed place that has served as my church for most of the 21^st Century. These postings have come in the order that their subjects arise in a typical visit, contemplating the enemy graves, the battle and fallen Minute Man memorialized there. We now follow the path to the Visitor's Center. After a short while it turns sharply to the right. The road used to fork here and the left fork continues on as a mowed path through the grass past the ruined foundation of Capt. David Brown's farm. I often stop here to contemplate the subject of this posting, but for a while there has been an even more concrete focus to be found further up the path.

The Hancock

In the Visitor's Center we find "The Hancock", one of the two remaining cannons from the cache that Gov. Gage had sent his men to confiscate. It is on loan from the Bunker Hill Monument in Boston (which commemorates the battle fought on Breed's Hill, but that is a story for another day). Like the other remaining cannon believed to be from the Concord cache, "The Adams", the Hancock is named after one of the two dangerous radical leaders that Gage was seeking. It sits on a recently made gun carriage not unlike the ones found and burned in downtown Concord resulting in the smoke that made the men of Concord fear their town was being burned. Together they represent the triggering causes of the "shot heard round the world", the outbreak of the War that would give birth to one great nation and begin the fall from power of another.

All that because Gage feared this weapon and its like in the hands of Hancock, Adams and the bands of insurgents and unlawful combatants who sided with them, to put it in the terms of my earlier postings. All this because rather than treat with men like Hancock and Adams, he and his superiors across the sea chose a preemptive military action, to interdict the radicals and their weapons of war.

But that formulation is all from the point of view of the British, their motives, their mistakes and the strategic failures that they led to. These are important in light of the analogy to our failure to apply the lessons of Concord to modern times, but now let us look at The Hancock and its fellows from the perspective of the Colonists. What does it tell us about their motives and beliefs, about the oft-cited Founding Fathers, their beliefs and assumptions?

To put it bluntly, the Battle of Concord was fought in part over the right of the people to bear arms, and not just pistols, and fowling pieces, but cannons—weapons of war. Gage moved precipitously and disastrously because he did not believe that the weapons of war belong in private hands, a view shared by many Americans today. But what Captain Davis and Private Hosmer died for on the North Bridge was their belief in the right and the need for the people to remain armed. Captain Davis was a gunsmith who drilled his Minute Company with bayonets and shot that he supplied them with, who died defending right of the men of a nearby town to possess cannons, powder, shot and the stores needed to field their militias against a government they found tyrannical.

When we write of Colonel Barrett, Captains Davis and Brown and the other colonial officers, it is easy to think of them as commissioned officers because of the titles of rank the bore, but there is an important distinction between Col. Barrett and Col. Francis Smith, the redcoat who lead his soldiers into Concord, between Capt. Davis and Capt. Walter Laurie who lead the troops on the other side of the bridge. Capt. Laurie, commander of the 43rd Regiment of Foot bore a King's Commission. He was a Captain in the King's army because the King said he was. His authority over his troops devolved to him because he and his superiors were appointed by the King or his appointees.

Capt. Davis was a captain because his fellow citizens in Acton said he was. Capt. Davis was elected. He served his town and his neighbors because he volunteered to and they elected him. His bravery, familiarity with firearms and willingness to supply and train his neighbors qualified him. Before the battle he and Major Buttrick, whose house is just beyond the Visitor's Center, and who drilled his men on the very field upon which the Colonials were gathered, and Capt. Brown, his next door neighbor, whose family watched the battle, and Col. Barrett whose field hid the cannons. They met to discuss and decide what to do because they were responsible not to a distant Governor or more distant King, but to the men who would die following their orders. The men, their neighbors, who elected them to make these decisions.

I stress the distinction between the commissioned officers of the King's army and the elected officers of the colonial militias and Minute companies because it is important in understanding who the cannons belonged to (ignoring for the moment the fact that they may very well have stolen them from the British). They belonged to the People. Even in 1775, before the Declaration of Independence, before the Constitution of the United States of America, these men gathered in Concord believed that political and even military power arose from the people.

The cannons were not Col. Barrett's, not Hancock's or Concord's. The cannon belong to the people. Barrett had them because he was the a senior officer in the people's militia, and was capable, as he proved, of protecting them until they were needed. He needed no authorization from the King, no commission as an officer. Rather he had the trust and respect of the men who elected and followed him, who were willing to die following his orders or those of Capt. Davis or Maj. Buttrick.

That this is so becomes quite clear a little more than a year later when John Hancock, the dangerous fanatic who fled Lexington with John Adams a few hours before the fight at the Bridge, and who would become the first Governor of the State of Massachusetts, seventh President of the United States in Congress Assembled, signed a document that declared that

... Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, ...

and

... But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, ...

And that is the importance of the cannon, since named after him, that lay concealed in the furrows of Col. Barrett's field, and the shot, powder and amassed provisions that were stored in his neighbors' houses. They enabled the people, the militia, to throw off British rule, to revolt against the government that they judged to be despotic.

These men did not believe in the inherent authority of the Commander in Chief and Supervisor of the Unitary Executive to ignore the law, whether he called himself the King and claimed Divine Right or President elected by a minority of the citizenry. They believed in retaining not only their rights, and the right and obligation to revolt. They also believed in the retaining the cannons, the weapons of war, to enable them to exercise those rights and duties to overthrow despots not merely foreign, but domestic.

It is all well and good to try to claim that

A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

means something else, but as the men who laid down their lives in Concord on Patriot's Day, April 19, 1775, demonstrated, the men who hallowed this ground did so in defense of the right to bear cannon, and the right to revolt. And it was not merely the men of the Commonwealth who believed this. In response to Shay's Rebellion, a little more than a dozen years later the Virginian Thomas Jefferson wrote:

A little rebellion now and then is a good thing. …God forbid we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion. The people cannot be all, and always, well informed. The part which is wrong will be discontented, in proportion to the importance of the facts they misconceive. If they remain quiet under such misconceptions, it is lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty. …And what country can preserve its liberties, if its rulers are not warned from time to time, that this people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The remedy is to set them right as to the facts, pardon and pacify them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time, with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.

And here's the paradox of liberty. This country whose founding documents proclaim the right of revolution, the right of the populace to be armed enabling such a revolution, was the site of a singular event, as a man dressed in colonial garb at the foot of the Concord obelisk pointed out to me yesterday. Twenty two years after the Battle of Concord, John Adams, the second dangerous radical who fled with Hancock, after whom the other cannon is named was inaugurated as President, under the following history making conditions.

1. The outgoing Head of State was still alive
2. The incoming Head of State was not related to the outgoing
3. The turnover was entirely peaceful
   
4. The incoming and outgoing Heads of State disagreed about major policies
5. The military was not involved

The country that believed in and was based on the right of revolt—armed revolt—was the birthplace of the entirely peaceful and orderly change of government.

And so, I disagree with those who seek to keep assault rifles and other weapons of war out of citizen's hands, to confine them only to duly appointed representatives of the government. Men died hallowing the ground where I pray in defense of just the opposite.

I met another man on the path of this sacred place, one who disagreed with some of what I have said in this series, who quoted me an old Shi'ite proverb that Iblis, the devil, was the first to reason by analogy, and that underscores the admonition that I usually end my blog postings with: Don't believe me. Read and research for yourself. Think and pray. Discuss with those who not only agree with you, but those who do not. Make your own decisions and act to preserve your country.

Be a Free Voice, the Voice of Liberty
Cry "Freedom!"
Vox Libertas

This is the third in my series of postings capturing my thoughts and reflections from my frequent visits to the Old North Bridge in Concord, the site to which I most often go to pray and meditate these last half dozen years. The course of this series has followed my usual path through the site. In the first, I started where each visit begins and ends, at the graves of the two British soldiers. In the second, I proceeded to the obelisk and contemplated the historic parallels between their mission to Concord and our invasion of Iraq. In this installment we proceed across the bridge to the monument that was the reason for my visit  on September 12, 2001, the first time I came to the site explicitly to pray.

Minuteman at Dusk

Today, we visit the Concord Minuteman. My prayer on September 12 was one of thanksgiving as well as one of mourning and remembrance. It seemed clear to me that just as the Minutemen defended their homes and neighbors in Colonial America, a number of  the passengers of Flight 93 constituted the Militia in 2001. The details were sketchy, but it seemed clear from the reports of phone calls from the passengers that a group of men and women had gathered, determined that the hijackers had to be stopped from using their plane as a weapon, and charged the cockpit.

I came here to honor them, and their predecessors of the last 3 centuries, free citizens, volunteers who have stood to defend our Republic and Commonwealth. A few weeks later, in early October, I came here to pray before writing an essay entitled "9-11: America Victorious", in which I protested the portrayal of 9-11 as an American failure. This angered me because it gives too little credit to patriots like Beamer, Bingham, Burnett, and Glick who exemplify the Minuteman spirit.

In all the times that I have discussed this subject at the foot of the Minuteman statue, never has anyone disagreed with my contention that the Flight 93 heroes are the modern versions of Isaac Davis, and his fellows. Some have been surprised that they hadn't thought of it that way before, but none have taken issue.

Not so my other observation. You see, the Minuteman as portrayed in Daniel Chester French's statue is clearly an Unlawful Combatant, or more correctly, he is not in terms of the Geneva Conventions, a "Lawful Combatant". According to Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, in order to qualify as a Prisoner of War (a Lawful Combatant), one must fulfill the following requirements:

(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

The colonial militias at the time of the Battle of Concord wore no uniforms, and displayed no fixed distinctive sign, though some did wear war paint and others cockades, but these were more designation of rank than of allegiance. It can also be argued that they did not conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Certainly it was so argued at the time. One of the fallen British soldiers at the North Bridge was described by a fellow as appearing to have been scalped. The militia fired from cover, retreated into civilian houses and blended into the civilian populace. There is reason to believe that the cannons that the Governor was looking for in Concord were stolen from the British in Worcester. In the months leading up to the Battle of Concord, the militia had been used to intimidate the Governor's appointed judges, and so on.

Please, dear reader, understand that I do not say these things to disparage the Minutemen or the militias in general. You will be hard pressed to find someone more proud of the history or citizens of the Commonwealth or the Republic. I vehemently support the revolutionaries and insurgents who were our founding fathers. They were free men who fought for Liberty and for us, their descendants. They founded one of, if not the, greatest countries ever to grace the pages of history.

Rather, I bring these things up because I am critical of the Geneva Conventions and even more so of our nation's relationship to them. You see, in direct contradiction of the policies and opinions of the current administration, I hold that the Geneva Conventions do not cover enough people, rather than too many. They are not quaint, should not be abandoned or narrowed. The should be expanded. As they stand they would not cover the very men who fought to create our country. They would not cover the farmer who sets aside his plow to take up his rifle.

Ah, but you say, what of paragraph 6? (At least those of you facile with GCIII Article 4, Section A.) What of

6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

We were, however an occupied territory, a colony. Recall, if you will, that what had the Colonists up in arms (literally)—gathering the cannons, muskets and ammunition that Governor Gage sent his troops to find and confiscate were the "Intolerable Acts", including the Quartering Act, the reason that that the framers felt it was necessary to include in the Constitution the prohibition that

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Also, we had plenty of time. We had organized militias for more than a century. We did not "spontaneously take up arms". We chose the path of irregular militias rather than regular armies. No, paragraph 6 is not for us.

I'm no lawyer, especially not one versed in international law, so there may be something that I have overlooked, some way in which one might argue that the colonial militiamen might be covered by GCIII and GCIV, but at best, the matter is unclear. And so, if we were to be true to the history of our nation, we would be pressing the international community to  extend the coverage of the Geneva Conventions, and not as the current administration has done, worked to restrict that coverage.

This country was founded by insurgents, by free men who banded together for self protection who believed that the government was "of, by and for the people", that it takes its legitimacy from the will and the consent of the governed. We reject monarchy based on divine right and the subordination of the people to the state. The restrictions in the Geneva Conventions are based on the premise that only a state may raise an army, that fighters who are part of a recognized army fielded by a legitimate state should be protected. Individuals who fight for their own liberty, for the defense of their neighbors without state blessing are not as valued and protected. Unlawful Combatants. Insurgents and other non-state sponsored individuals are not protected. This should not be surprising as the Geneva Conventions are agreements between states.

It is perfectly understandable, but in terms of what happened on April 19, 1775, and the years that followed it, of the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitutions of the United States and of the several Sates, it is not very American. It is very Bush, however. The current administration believes very much in rule by a strong individual, a Commander in Chief who is the sole decider in a Unified Executive. They have advanced political theories that dismiss individual liberty for the good of the State and the nation. They have sought to limit the number of people protected by the Geneva Conventions, and by our laws. For them, States are more important than individuals, rights are granted to citizens by the state rather than the other way around, and of course all power in the state is wielded by the sole supervisor of the unitary executive.

The lesson of Isaac Davis, the Acton Minuteman immortalized in the Concord Minuteman statue is that the farmer, the gunsmith, the man who was convinced that if he took up arms he would die, takes up arms because it is the right thing to do, because a patriot protects his neighbor's town from being burned by an occupying army seeking to disarm honest farmers. Here is not a soldier, not a lawful combatant, but a gunsmith, a farmer, a free man, chosen by the common consent of his fellows, to lead the first charge.

This is America.

But as ever, don't believe me. Read the history of the Battle of Concord and the Intolerable Acts. Read of the life of Isaac Davis, and the owl he believed foretold his death but which did not hold him back. Read the story of  Mark Bingham, the gay patriot from San Francisco and the words of his mother, Alice Hoglan regarding the ground that is hallowed by the bones of her son and the terrorists he died fighting. Decide for yourself what the memorials in Concord mean at their heart, what it means to honor the enemy dead, what it means to live in a Commonwealth and a Republic founded by insurgents, rebels and and citizen soldiers.

Be a free voice.
Be Liberty's voice.
Cry, "Freedom!"

Vox Libertas

This is the second of my postings, capturing my thoughts and reflections at the Old North Bridge in Concord, Massachusetts, site of the "shot heard round the world". In the first, I introduced the series with a consideration of the import of the memorial to the two fallen British soldiers. In this installment, I will consider how they came to be there and how those events echo our own time.

I go often to pray and ponder at the North Bridge, walk down the processional aisle between the twin rows of pines, stop to pay my respects at the graves of the two British soldiers and to pray not only for them but for all soldiers who fight and die in foreign lands, for our soldiers who are overseas and for our Republic. My next stop, is the obelisk, a few feet behind me.

North Bridge Obelisk

I came to this spot, between the two monuments, one month short of the 208th anniversary of the Battle of Concord, on March 19, 2003 to contemplate what brought these two British soldiers to this spot.

They were sent, you see, on a mission to seek out and confiscate or destroy Weapons of War in the hands of dangerous fanatics who were a threat to their homeland thousands of miles away, and to capture and arrest two of the most dangerous of the fanatics' leaders. They never found the weapons. They never captured the leaders. But the locals, fearing that their town was being burned down by the invading army, who by the way, were actually trying to save the town, took up arms, joined the militias in huge numbers and using tactics that violated the rules of war drove the invading army back to the capital city, where they remained besieged until they withdrew. The mission, the invasion, the occupation, emboldened the fanatics, allowed them to recruit huge numbers, and assisted by foreign fighters hostile to the invading army drove them from the area. In doing so, they set an example for fanatics, separatists and nationalists around the world and a globe-spanning empire declined and fell.

The next day, March 20, 2003, it was my fears and not my prayers that were answered. This time the Great Power was the United States and not Great Britain. The Weapons of War were chemical and biological weapons, and perhaps a nascent nuclear project rather than cannons and as we have subsequently learned, seem not to have existed—the cannons were only hidden. But the story was nonetheless familiar. 

Of course, the analogy is imperfect. Saddam was undoubtedly a despot and had little in common with Adams and Hancock, and we were legitimately a British colony, and so on, but still, there are important lessons in terms of the strategy, the cost of tactical errors, and the like. To someone steeped in the history of the Battle of Concord, the siege of Boston and the American Revolution, some of these lessons are glaring. The soldiers buried here were their nation's first casualties in a series of conflicts that saw their homeland lose its influence in the area and its possessions and prominence throughout the world.

I had originally planned to give a more detailed account of the Battle of Concord and its analogy to our invasion of Iraq, but in keeping with my oft repeated urging that you not believe me, but rather inform yourselves and make your own decisions, let me refer you to the Wikipedia's article on the battle. You will find that the article is tagged as having its accuracy and neutrality challenged. The reason is that a couple of people feel that it is biased in favor of the British, and speculate this is due to foreign editors. As a matter of fact, the main editors are locals, and their understanding is quite like mine. But perhaps more importantly for my purposes here, since I am drawing an analogy between the colonials and modern Iraqis, and the the British and the modern US, that bias if it does exist works against and not in favor of my points.

I'll wait here while you go read the article.

This is the first in a series that I plan to post, capturing the thoughts and reflections that I have when I go to one of my favorite and most sacred places, the Old North Bridge in Concord, Massachusetts. For most of this new millennium, the bridge and its environs has been my church and my retreat, the place I go to pray, to think, to find my balance. It has been such for a number of reasons. First, it was the site of pivotal events which shaped history for the centuries to come, and which resonate with the events that move us most profoundly today. Second, it is a place where men laid down their lives for their country. Finally, as a piece of nature, the arching bridge over the flowing river reminds me of the miracle of nature and creation.

Each of these articles should be short and focus on one theme, one line of thought of the several that I focus on when I go to the bridge. My time there, my meditations on nature, life, death and sacrifice, my ponderings of the history made there and its place in the larger fabric of American life and history have provided me with what I regard as important lessons and reminders, and so I'd like to share those with others.

The first spot, and the last that I always visit there will be the focus of this first reflection. I expect that it will be shorter and perhaps simpler than most of those that follow. But, as with my visits, I hope it will set the groundwork, the initial tone, of my postings, just as visiting the spot itself sets the context for my visits.

Grave of the British Soldiers

The spot is the graves of two British soldiers who were killed at the bridge on April 19, 1775. For those who have not vsited the site, let me set the scene. The bridge is not far from Monument Road, and you approach it down a broad path between rows of high arching pine trees, trees intentionally planted there to create something of a cathedral in the pines atmosphere. The path leads straight to the obelisk monument, and off to the left, by the inevitable New England stone wall, there is a small chained off area, with two Union Jacks and a large inscribed stone. Usually, there are flowers on the graves. If the pines create a cathedral effect, the graves are a small chapel to the side. They are small and unremarkable, at least physically.

But in another way they are most remarkable. All over the world you can find war memorials, grave sites, and markers to the fallen dead of past wars. But here, without much fanfare is one of the most unique. It is a memorial to the Enemy's Honored Dead. Think of that. Not to our nation's fallen heroes, not to the local boys who gave their lives, but to the fallen enemies, to those who were seen as invaders and a threat to the town, to two of the first casualties of the American Revolutionary War, even though they were on the other side.

This unique memorial says a lot to me about who we are as a people. Many of my ancestors are Celts, Irishmen and Scots, people who are renowned  for their abilities to keep a feud alive for years, and generations. And so it is the world over, where wars are often fought over slights and insults generations or centuries old. But here, in America, "the Great Melting Pot", historical enemies have learned to live side by side, to hang together lest we hang separately. The first permanent colonists in the Commonwealth, the Pilgrims and the Puritans, came here seeking not religious tolerance, but the freedom to, in the case of the Pilgrims, create a separate community run by their own strict principles or in the case of the Puritans, to purify the Anglican church, according to very similar principles. Names like "Cotton Mather" are not associated with tolerance.

A century and a half later, as the United States emerged, Americans had learned that Quakers, Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Deists all had to set apart their differences, to live and work side by side with those with whom they disagreed upon the most fundamental truths and principles, that if freedom, democracy and the rule of law were rule in place of the King as joint head of Church and State then differences and old grudges must be set aside. Not surprisingly, once the Revolution and its echo, the War of 1812 were past, we tended to see Great Britain and Canada as perhaps rivals, but not real enemies.

And so, 130 years ago, the British graves were protected by pillars and chains donated by an English ex-pat, and we honor their deaths, and their role in the founding of our nation. We lay flowers on their graves, and mark it with their flag, and write words that praise their bravery. And that, is something not often seen now or through history. It is a small thing, but one of many that make me proud to live in my Commonwealth and my country.

And as I look at our present day conflicts, I start with a prayer that we can understand those on the other side and those caught up in the middle as we have come to understand those whom we fought 232 years ago. In part, these two soldiers died in a conflict that had been growing inevitably for years, and in part they died due to misunderstandings and confusions that arose in the heat of the moment. They died as a result of the folly of their superiors, immediate and ultimate, and helped to start a struggle that led to the fall of their Empire. I pray, each visit, that we can learn from them; that we can avoid similar follies; that we do not plunge our great Republic into a similar decline from greatness.

I visit their graves with both pride and humility. Only a great people can afford to honor their fallen enemies, and great nations can fall through hubris and folly.

In future installments, I will deal with such topics as the parallels between the Battle of Concord and the War in Iraq, the Minutemen and the Geneva Convention, and Concord's relationship to the Second Amendment, any one if which is likely to be a bit more controversial than this piece.

Until then, be a Free Voice.
Cry, Liberty.
Vox Libertas

John Yoo Review, part II

In part 1 of my review of John Yoo's book, The Powers of War and Peace, I criticized him for his flawed understanding of history, and of how things today differ from from the last century or two. In this article, my focus is more his reasoning and analysis of history. I think that the inescapable conclusion of this review is that even if we accept his premises and his reasoning we find that he provides arguments that directly contradict the doctrines and actions of the Bush administration.

In a day when a professor of government at Harvard University can write a serious piece in the Wall Street Journal arguing that the country needs and the US Constitution allows for "one-man rule" in preference to the Rule of Law, I believe it is particularly important to carefully read, analyze, and where necessary rebut writers like John Yoo and Harvey Mansfield who are providing the theoretical basis for the turn towards authoritarian rule.

In part 1, I suggested that Yoo's misrepresentation of history had several possible causes. Among them, one of the most likely was that he was serving a political agenda. In chapter's 2-5, we some evidence for that agenda—Yoo focuses very strongly on showing that the fact that the Legislature has the power to declare war does not mean that the President requires their permission to initiate military actions or hostilities, and that likewise making, breaking and interpreting treaties is an executive function. By so focusing on these points, however, he ignores several implications of his reasoning that weaken the justification for a strong unified executive that is free of legislative interference.

The first example of this appeared in the introduction. There, while considering the implications of Article II of the Constitution granting the Senate the power to ratify treaties, he wrote:

the Senate's participation in treatymaking and appointments reflects an effort to dilute the unitary nature of the executive branch, rather than to transform these function into legislative powers. When the Constitution, for example, grants the executive a power that is legislative in nature, such as the veto power, it does so in Article II. Participation of the Senate in treatymaking does not transform treaties into legislative acts, just as its role in appointments does not make the appointment of officers legislative in nature.

Because the distinction between executive and legislative powers is critical to his argument that the President enjoys the power to engage the nation in military conflicts and to negotiate treaties without the Congress's permission, he must draw sharp distinction between the unenumerated executive power that is vested in him from the power of the legislature. Thus, he views the Senate as acting, in this case, in a role analogous to the privy council in Britain or the Governor's Council in Massachusetts and the like. But in so doing he must ascribe to the founders the desire to dilute the "unitary executive" of which we hear so much.

Either the Senate is exercising legislative oversight in the making of treaties and appointments or the Senate is in these instances acting with executive power. In either case the notion of the President as the sole supervisor of a unitary executive is weakened. In the choice that Yoo has made in his analysis, we see the President's executive power tempered by the oversight and approval of a part of the federal executive that he does not supervise. Thus, when he argues in signing statements that the executive branch need not follow the laws as passed by the legislature, and does so as the sole supervisor of the executive branch, he does so in direct contradiction to Yoo's analysis.

If we make the other choice, that the Senate is part of the legislative branch and any powers granted to it are legislative in nature regardless of which Article they appear in, then we have clear instances where the President is subject to direct legislative oversight and approval, and when the President argues in his signing statements that the executive need not follow the dictates of the legislature in order to preserve the separation of powers, again we have counter examples. No matter which choice we take in this dilemma, Yoo has supplied us with a counter-argument for the independent and unitary executive that the neo-cons wish to claim.

Moving to the chapters that I had explicitly targeted with this part of my review, we come to another major contradiction of administration and neo-conservative theory, this time in the area of the declaration of war. A large portion of Yoo's book focuses on countering the arguments of "pro-congress" scholars who assert that it is illegal or unconstitutional for the President to engage in warfare without Congress's formal declaration of war. To do so, he argues that at the time of the writing of the Constitution it was clearly understood that a declaration of war neither initiated nor authorized military action. He writes in the section on British law at the time of the revolution:

First, it [the declaration of war] notified the enemy that a state of war existed between them. If a nation warned its enemy of future hostilities, its later actions would receive the protection of international law. A declaration announced that hostile actions by its soldiers were taken under national aegis, and thus did not constitute piracy or robbery.

p. 33

Second, declarations played a domestic legal role by informing citizens of an alteration in their legal rights and status.

p. 34

Thus, a declaration of war served the purpose of notifying the enemy, allies, neutrals, and one's own citizens of a change in the state of relations between one nation and another. In none of these situations did the declaration of war serve as a vehicle for domestically authorizing war.

p. 34

In the section on the colonial constitutions, he explains even more explicitly:

The declaration of war's main purpose lay not in authorizing military operations, but in triggering the governor's exercise of his domestic powers, such as the authorization to impose martial law.

p. 61

If we follow Yoo's reasoning, we may find that we must concede that the President does not need a declaration of war in order to commit the nation to armed conflict, but we must also find that without a declaration of war, the powers that the President has been claiming as Commander in Chief to authorize warrant-less wire taps, hold "enemy combatants" indefinitely, and so forth, are not permitted to him. Every time the President tells us "we are at war, and extraordinary measures are necessary", he is exceeding his authority, unless there is a declaration of war, according to Yoo's own analysis.

This line of reasoning finds it full conclusion in the following passage in the section where he analyzes the Constitution itself, which somehow the administration and the neo-cons don't seem to ever cite:

Textually, a declaration of war places the nation in a state of total war, which triggers enhanced powers on the part of the federal government

p. 151

A paragraph later, he expands on the type of enhanced powers that require a declaration of war.

Congress has recognized the distinction between declared total wars and nondeclared hostilities by providing the executive branch with expanded domestic powers—such as seizing foreign property, conducting warrantless surveillance, arresting enemy aliens, and taking control of transportation systems, to name a few—only when war is declared.

p. 151, (emphasis mine.)

Most remarkably, a few pages later, Yoo distinguishes the declaration of war from the "Authorization of the Use of Military Force" (AUMF) and other similar Congressional acts, when he writes:

With both Iraq and Afghanistan, a supporter of the Declare War Clause theory of war powers may well have felt the Constitution satisfied because of the two statutes authorizing hostilities—even though these scholars have never explained why authorizing statutes satisfy the requirement for a declaration of war.

p. 157

This is in very stark contrast with Yoo's own argument that "because the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the President possesses the constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to engage in warrantless surveillance of enemy activity." By his very definitions, this authority only applies in a declared war.

Conclusions

And so, we find that the very theories that John Yoo uses to argue for the strengthening the powers of the President, contain within them very powerful arguments against the way that the the Bush administration has exercised his supposed authority. Yoo, himself argues that the founding fathers wish to dilute the unitary nature of the executive by granting executive powers to the Senate, acting as an independent executive council, approving appointments and treaties.

More significantly, Yoo writes explicitly that the use of extraordinary war-time powers, such as warrantless surveillance require a declaration of war, and that the authorization of of military action in Afghanistan and Iraq does not qualify as a declaration of war.

If one of President Bush's own theoreticians and Justice Department appointments, a man credited with providing the foundation for doctrine of the unitary executive and the view of the President as wielding unenumerated executive powers, tells us that the founding fathers wish to dilute the unitary executive and that warrantless wire-tapping requires a declaration of war, how can we avoid drawing the conclusion Bush has exceeded his authority, violated the law, and violated the Constitution?

As ever, don't believe me. Investigte for yourself. Read the Constitution. Borrow Yoo's book from the library. (I find it hard to recommend buying it.) Peruse The Founders Constitution, an excellent collections of historical documents related to the Constitution. Read the "John Yoo says surveillance illegal" in the Daily Kos, for another conflict between his reasoning and administration practice.

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To Be Continued...

I have been reading The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11 by John Yoo, and my reactions to it are strong and complex enough that I've decided to critique it here on on Vox Libertas. This page is the first in a planned series. I have not finished reading the book yet, and so the course of this series is not planned out, but so far, I see three major classes of difficulty with the book. They are:

1. His assumptions about history and the state of the world today are wrong.
2. His arguments are fallacious, often based on cherry-picking his evidence to suit some agenda or preconceptions.
3. Even if you buy in to his reasoning and conclusions, the actions of the Bush administration are often in conflict with the results. 

Flawed From the Start

Yoo, himself, points out that his views are in sharp contrast with the prevailing views on the Constitution:

This book proposes a constitutional theory of the foreign affairs powers that differs, at times sharply, from the conventional academic wisdom but that describes more accurately the actual practice of the three branches of government.

p. viii

Others have also noticed this difference, but have a different explanation. See, for instance, Andrew Napolitano's book, Constitutional Chaos: What Happens When the Government Breaks Its Own Laws. Where Judge Napolitano sees the government breaking the law and violating the Constitution, and warns that we are becoming a government of men, and not laws, Yoo urges us to revise our understanding of the Constitution in light of what may appear to be unlawful practice. This difference is crucial and perhaps critical, and so Yoo's revisionist reasoning should be examined closely.

Yoo recounts some of the last two or three decades of political theory in the area of treaties and war powers, and contrasts the historical context in which they were written with what he sees as our current circumstance.

At the time such leading scholarly works as those mentioned above were written, the nature of war continued to be thought of as occurring solely between nation-states. The Persian Gulf War had just witnessed an American-led coalition's defeat of Iraq's grab for Kuwait—a traditional war over territory fought by the regular armed forces of nation-states. Nation-states were presumed to be both rational and susceptible to various levels of coercion, with force often being used only as a last resort.

p. ix

Thus, he claims, the theories of the day were based on this view of current events.

The disappearance of the threat of a war that could directly harm American national security allowed policymakers and intellectuals the luxury to envision a future in which they could reduce the overall level of armed conflict.

p. ix

Please notice that while this is possible, it should be remembered that Yoo himself is proposing that current practice should serve as a basis for political theory, and that his predecessors in general did not claim to work this way.

The Myth of Post-9/11

In his preface Yoo presents a view of recent history that will be familiar to anyone who has heard the Bush administration and their neo-con theoreticians defend their policies and actions:

The World after September 11, 2001, however, is very different. It is no longer clear that the United States must seek to reduced the amount of warfare, and it certainly is no longer clear that the constitutional system ought to be fixed so as to make it difficult to use force. Rather than disappearing from the world, the threat of war may well be increasing. Threats now come from at least three primary sources: the easy availability of the knowledge and technology to create weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the emergence of rogue nations; and the rise of international terrorism of the kind represented by the al Qaeda terrorist organization.

pp. ix-x

At the heart of this passage is the argument that three new developments provide us with justification for extreme actions and a change of course. Specifically, he cites:

1. availability of knowledge and technology for WMD
2. emergence of "rogue" nations
3. rise of international terrorism

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the hands of dangerous radicals are the reason given for the invasion of Iraq, for isolating the "Axis of Evil", and for finding ourselves on the brink of adding a third war to our collection in the Middle East. I go regularly to pray at the grave site of other soldiers sent on a similar mission more than two centuries ago. You see, Concord, Massachusetts is the next town over and at the Old North Bridge there is a memorial to the British soldiers who died there in the Battle of Concord. It starts,

They came 3000 miles and died to keep the past upon its throne.

Before 2001, I'd only been there a couple of times, but since going there in remembrance of the modern Minute Men who died on Flight 93, I return regularly, so the story of the Battle of Concord may well be more familiar to me than to many of you, my readers. Let me recap.

The British had heard that the colonial militia had canons, long arms, shot and gunpowder stored in Concord, and between 700 and 800 troops were sent out under the command of Lt. Col. Francis Smith to retrieve these weapons to prevent them from being used by radical insurgents who objected to the occupation of nearby Boston by British troops. By the time they arrived in Concord there were few weapons to be found, but they burned a few gun carriages on the common near the meeting house. The militiamen gathered nearby saw the smoke and charged the British troops that were stationed near the North Bridge. They outnumbered the British more than 4-to-1, and the Red Coats took their first fatalities, the aforementioned soldiers whose memorial is there today.

The British withdrew, and were joined by a slightly smaller force, and though they now numbered about 1300, the militias grew even faster and the British routed and retreated to Boston. The militias gathering around the city turned into the Siege of Boston, which turned into the American War of Independence, which was the first of a number of secessionist wars that resulted in the collapse of the British Empire, the first power upon whom the sun never set.

The point of recounting that bit of history is that fear of dangerous weapons of war, and mass destruction is not new. Ah, but you say, cannons and gunpowder are not weapons of mass destruction of the calibre that we face today. That is true, but they were serious enough to threaten the largest cities of the day and cause sufficient destruction to threaten a city or a nation's economy.

And they were not the only WMDs. Think of the smallpox-infected blankets used in the Siege of Fort Pitt. Think of the terror of mustard gas in The Great War—WWI. Recall, if you will, that when we speak of Saddam using WMDs, mustard gas was what he used on the Kurds and the Iranians. The same WMD used by the Germans on Canadians 90 years ago.

Every era has its terror weapons, in the light of which all that came before always seem like child's play. Familiarity breeds contempt. New technology is scary.

The Emergence of Rogue Nations is no more a new thing than WMDs, or the dangers of new technology and knowledge. Take, for instance the so-called "Barbary States", home of the Turkish Corsairs or "Barbary Pirates", the area the Islamic world calls the Maghreb. From the Western perspective, this area has long been ruled by strongmen and pirates since the days of the Crusades, much of the time under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire, financed by tribute, ransom, slavery and plunder.

(Note that all of the European powers also commissioned privateers, and that the early economy of the United States was closely tied to slavery, and that the people of North Africa and the Middle East, like my celtic ancestors are a tribal people, basing their power structures on familial ties rather than territory and lines on maps.)

To the extent that the term "rogue nation" means anything it means outlaw nations that don't obey what we recognize as the civilized international law. Besides the Barbary States of the Maghreb which the US has fought since it gained its independence from England (see the "Shores of Tripoli" reference in the marine hymn), our early history with the French and "their" indians (not to be confused with "our indians" who harassed the French, and the demonized "wild indians" of the American West), is full of nations that fit that definition. And just as the indians learned to scalp their enemies from Europeans, it was after all, the US that helped build the Afghani Mujahideen up to fight the Russians.

No, the United States has dealt with deadly enemies whose culture was way outside of our notion of civilized international relationships since before the country was founded. Which brings us to the terrorist threat.

International Terrorism isn't a new development in the world, nor unfamiliar to Americans.

I've already mentioned the "French and Indian War", but conflict between the French and British colonies, was much longer lived than that one war. Both sides harassed the other through their surrogate allied native tribes. As mentioned above, one of the things the European powers taught their Indian clients was the taking of scalps to as proof for the awarding of bounties. Beyond scalping, fire and kidnapping were frequent tactics in the guerilla and terrorist struggle along the colonial boundaries.

As the conflict turned from British vs French to colonist/Americans vs Indians, the intentional depletion of game animals, disease infected blankets and the distribution of addictive drugs in the form of alcohol were added to the repertoire of terrorist tactics. Make no mistake about it, early American history involved terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism. Biological weapons and a drug trade in the hands of terrorists were all known, and practiced by the British, French, Native Americans and the United States.

Although Yoo doesn't explicitly mention "Ethnic Cleansing" among his list of modern ailments, it is worth considering that the New World knew it not only in the treatment of Native Americans, but also in the form of the expulsion of the Acadians from Nova Scotia to, among other places, New Orleans, where we know them as the "cajuns". And speaking of New Orleans, there was also piracy and privateering familiar to the denizens of New Orleans and those along the Anglo/Spanish frontiers.

Returning to terrorism, and moving on to the 19th century there was the wave of revolutions that swept through Europe in the 1840s. In America, we had Bloody Kansas leading up to the Civil War, and during it, the guerilla warfare of Quantrell and Bloody Bill Anderson, and Sherman's march to the sea, all of which could legitimately be described as terrorism, at least by those on the receiving end. Anarchist terrorism grew through the last decades of the 19th century and into the 20th, where, it was the spark that ignited World War I, with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria.

It makes great propaganda to talk about how "the whole world changed" after 9/11, but it does not accurately reflect history or the American experience. We may have had a few illusions dispelled, but WMDs, rogue nations, international and state-sponsored terrorism are all familiar, or should be, to Americans with any historical perspective.

And Flawed to Its Heart

This historical weakness, unfortunately, strikes to the very heart of Yoo's book because one of its main thrusts is to use history as a basis for his constitutional theory. For his theory to be sound, the understanding of history upon which it based must be sound.

Yoo's claims that everything has changed after 9/11 are, however, not historically sound, and that he makes them in the introduction to what is presented as a scholarly reconsideration of fundamental Constitutional issues, raises the question of where they come from. Some of the possibilities are:

• He is terribly misinformed.
• He has gotten swept up in the popular mythology.
• He is blinded by his own biases and preconceptions.
• He is cherry picking his facts to suit his theory.
• He is intentionally misleading us to sell his theory.

Any of these weaken the book. The later ones carry more blame, and given that he contributes substantially to the Bush Administration's theoretical basis for strengthening the centralized authority of the Presidency, give us good reason to be wary.

In the historical chapters that follow, Yoo appears to be cherry picking his history, to be seeking out those pieces that suit his theory, so perhaps that's what is happening here. Perhaps he is just blinded by his assumptions, biases and loyalty to the President.

Several of Yoo's claims make assumptions that he does little to prove,

These new threats to American national security, driven by changes in the international environment, should change the way we think about the relationship between the process and substance of the warmaking system....

If, however, the nature and level of threats are increasing and military force unfortunately remains the most effective means for responding to those threats, then it makes little sense to commit our political system to a single method for making war.

p. x, (emphasis mine.)

I have already provided numerous counter examples to his claimed new types of threats are emerging or increasing. The new claim that he interjects in these passages that military force is the most effective response to these threats, is also unsubstantiated, and should be questioned. It is, for instance, that US military forces has been entirely effective in Iraq.

As ever, don't believe me. Study history yourself. Check out The Powers of War and Peace from the library. If the book is too long for you, sample the memoranda he wrote as part of the Bush Administration. There are examples available at the DoJ and FindLaw. An interview with Yoo at the University of Chicago, includes both comments and quoted passages. The Harvard Law Review includes it in a broad review of 4 books. The Founders Constitution is an excellent collections of historical documents related to the Constitution.

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To Be Continued...